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SCHOOL SPEECH IN THE INTERNET AGE:  DO STUDENTS SHED 
THEIR RIGHTS WHEN THEY PICK UP A MOUSE? 
Michael J. O’Connor* 
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the 
Supreme Court definitively established that students do not “shed” 
their right to free speech “at the schoolhouse gate.”1  However, the 
Court also said that those rights must be “applied in light of the spe-
cial characteristics of the school environment . . . .”2  Ever since, there 
has been debate over the exact boundaries of those rights. 
There have been many changes in education since the Court de-
cided Tinker, the birth of the Internet being one of the most revolu-
tionary.  The Internet provides immense opportunity for education 
and enrichment, but it also exposes students to a vast array of dan-
gerous and offensive content, some of which could have been created 
by their classmates.  Such a bridge between the school environment 
and the outside world causes problems not envisioned in Tinker:  
without using any school resources, students can create obscene, in-
sulting, or disruptive content on their own time and expose all of 
their classmates to it. 
Though the Supreme Court has revisited and retailored the doc-
trine a number of times, only in its most recent school-speech case, 
Morse v. Frederick,3 has it even obliquely addressed the issue of off-
campus speech.  The Court has never directly discussed the implica-
tions of electronic speech.  Nevertheless, this Comment will suggest 
that such speech can be regulated, even when it occurs outside of 
school grounds, on the student’s own time, if it is substantially disrup-
tive and directed primarily at a school audience. 
Part I will discuss the Supreme Court’s precedent in the area, 
which began with the Tinker “substantial disruption” test.  Since then, 
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cases have made it clear that the “substantial disruption” test is not 
the only rubric under which schools can validly restrict student 
speech.  The Supreme Court has individually restricted both offen-
sively lewd speech in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser4 and pro-
drug speech in Morse.  The Court’s explicit recognition in Morse that 
“[w]hatever approach Fraser employed, it certainly did not conduct 
the ‘substantial disruption’ analysis prescribed by Tinker”5 makes it 
clear that these are two separate standards existing side-by-side.  It 
seems likely that in the future, courts will have to decide on a case-by-
case basis whether to “add[] to the patchwork of exceptions to the 
Tinker standard.”6  However, this Comment will consider whether 
such ad-hoc exceptions are ever appropriate for regulating off-
campus student speech and, if so, the type of exceptions that might 
qualify.  It will also attempt to consider whether this approach is in-
consistent with First Amendment jurisprudence, or whether the ap-
parent inconsistency is a result of looking at student speech in a vac-
uum. 
Part II will discuss the issue of location.  In Morse, the Supreme 
Court summarily rejected the plaintiff’s argument that a student ac-
tivity taking place across the street from the school during its normal 
hours was not school speech.7  However, it acknowledged “some un-
certainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts should apply 
school-speech precedents.”8  This Part will look at off-campus speech 
largely in isolation.  While electronic speech is a more recent and ar-
guably more dangerous phenomenon, schools and courts have been 
dealing for years with the issues created by off-campus student news-
papers and other vehicles for speech. 
It is clear that the bar is lower for restricting student speech.9  
That dichotomy does not end at the schoolhouse gate.  Students can 
be held responsible for speech occurring outside the school setting.  
This Comment will look at lower court precedent and outside com-
mentary and attempt to determine what exactly “off-campus” means, 
and what sway Tinker and its progeny hold in that realm. 
 
 4 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 5 127 S. Ct. at 2627. 
 6 Id. at 2636 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 7 See id. at 2624 (“Under these circumstances, we agree with the superintendent that Fre-
derick cannot ‘stand in the midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a school-
sanctioned activity and claim he is not at school.’” (citation omitted)). 
 8 Id. (citing Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 9 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682 (“[T]he constitutional rights of students in public school are 
not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”). 
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Part III will discuss technology’s promises and pitfalls.  The Inter-
net is vital to modern education because it is an integral component 
of research, business, and life in the modern world.  Teachers cannot 
and should not simply attempt to exclude it from their teaching.  
Nevertheless, it is a dangerous place.  Violence, pornography, hate 
speech, and countless other evils are available online.  The volume 
and variety of this material is a scathing indictment of humanity’s 
worst nature.  However, the freedom of communication that the 
Internet provides also makes possible some truly remarkable accom-
plishments, like Wikipedia’s army of volunteers attempting to make 
available “free access to the sum of all human knowledge.”10 
This Comment will focus on the recent rise of social networking 
sites.  Facebook and MySpace now claim tens of millions of users,11 
sorted into schools and geographical areas and tied together by lists 
of mutual friends, with even strangers often having access to some-
one’s personal information.12  In an environment like that, controver-
sial and damaging statements can spread like wildfire, without even 
the addressing required by e-mail.  This Comment will consider 
whether this unique environment gives school administrators more 
freedom to discipline students and whether courts should give 
greater deference to their decisions. 
Part IV will discuss what schools can do about all this.  What poli-
cies can they adopt, consistent both with their duty to protect and 
educate their students and with the strictures of the First Amend-
ment?  There are numerous paths schools could take, from proactive 
measures like using filtering software and including electronic of-
fenses in disciplinary codes, to reactive measures like the standard de-
tention, suspension, and expulsion.  Many seem like veritable consti-
tutional minefields. 
Some lower courts have already applied Morse to electronic stu-
dent speech, with mixed results.  Commentators have suggested that 
schools have a countervailing affirmative obligation to protect stu-
 
 10 Wikipedia Founder Jimmy Wales Responds (July 28, 2004, 13:00 EST), http://interviews.
slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/07/28/1351230 (interviewing Wikipedia’s founder about 
the project’s history and its direction). 
 11 Spencer E. Ante et al., In Search of MyProfits:  The Pressure Is on for Murdoch to Turn MySpace 
into a Cash Machine, BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 5, 2007, at 23 (noting that in September 2007 
Facebook had 30.6 million unique U.S. users while MySpace had 68.1 million). 
 12 See Simon Grose, Privacy Focus Caught in Web, CANBERRA TIMES, Nov. 5, 2007, at A15 (ad-
dressing the conflict between personal privacy and web 2.0 development:  “You can set 
your Facebook pages to limit who sees them, but many people don’t bother”). 
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dents from harassment.13  This Comment will review all of these 
sources and consider when schools can validly restrict student speech 
and what methods they can use to do it. 
I.  TINKER, BETHEL, AND MORSE:  A TRIO OF TESTS 
The First Amendment is phrased in clear and unambiguous 
terms:  “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”14  Its application has never been as clear as its text.  The 
Supreme Court has long recognized exceptions to freedom of 
speech, even before its incorporation against the states.15  While we 
value freedom of expression in this country, there is so little social 
value inherent in libel, obscenity, or speech inciting violence that so-
ciety tolerates and even encourages its restriction.16 
The Court has also recognized that these restrictions can shift 
with the identity of the speaker.  Since the incorporation of the First 
Amendment against the states,17 the Court has recognized that indi-
viduals like soldiers,18 prisoners,19 and students,20 by the nature of 
 
 13 See Susan H. Kosse, Student Designed Home Web Pages:  Does Title IX or the First Amendment 
Apply?, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 905 (2001) (suggesting a tension between Title IX and the First 
Amendment); Adam A. Milani, Harassing Speech in the Public Schools:  The Validity of Schools’ 
Regulation of Fighting Words and the Consequences if They Do Not, 28 AKRON L. REV. 187 
(1995) (suggesting a similar tension with Title VI and harassment on the basis of race). 
 14 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 15 See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding a conviction under the 
Espionage Act of 1917 for circulating leaflets challenging the draft during World War I). 
 16 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There are cer-
tain . . . limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never 
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.  These include the lewd and obscene, 
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words . . . .  It has been well ob-
served that such utterances . . . are of such slight social value . . . that any benefit that may 
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 17 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“For present purposes we may and do 
assume that freedom of speech and of the press—which are protected by the First 
Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights 
and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from 
impairment by the States.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 18 See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980) (“Thus, while members of the military ser-
vices are entitled to the protections of the First Amendment, ‘the different character of 
the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of 
those protections.’  The rights of military men must yield somewhat ‘to meet certain over-
riding demands of discipline and duty . . . .’” (citations omitted)). 
 19 See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407–12 (1989) (explaining that while prisoners 
do not lose their First Amendment rights, those rights must be weighed against penologi-
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their situation, cannot have the full gamut of rights normally ac-
corded adults. 
The watershed case in defining the free speech rights of students 
was Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, in which 
the Court concluded that “First Amendment rights, applied in light 
of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available 
to teachers and students.  It can hardly be argued that either students 
or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”21 
In Tinker, three students, after meeting with their parents and 
friends, decided to wear black armbands to protest the Vietnam 
War.22  Learning of this protest in advance, the school adopted a pol-
icy of suspending any student who wore an armband and refused to 
remove it.23  The students wore their armbands, were suspended, and 
filed suit in response.24 
The district court dismissed their complaint, and the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was equally divided en banc, thereby af-
firming the opinion below.25  After granting certiorari, the Supreme 
Court reversed, determining that schools could restrict student 
speech if it “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial dis-
order or invasion of the rights of others.”26 
For seventeen years, the material disruption standard remained 
the only law on the issue.  It is admittedly flexible, allowing school of-
ficials the leeway to restrict student speech in a wide variety of differ-
ent forms as long as they have a “well-founded expectation of disrup-
tion”27 arising from the speech’s content or its method of 
distribution.28  Nevertheless, even when setting the standard in Tinker, 
 
cal needs and the difficulties of prison administration, and applying a reasonableness 
standard instead of the Court’s normal strict scrutiny for speech restrictions). 
 20 See The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 157 (1969) (“The application of the 
first amendment in the public schools is limited by the circumstance that a state may re-
strict a child’s free expression in situations where similar restrictions on adults would 
clearly be unjustifiable.”). 
 21 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 22 Id. at 504. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 505. 
 26 Id. at 513. 
 27 Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 212 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 28 See Note, Prior Restraints in Public Schools, 82 YALE L.J. 1325, 1326–27 (1973) (explaining 
that schools can regulate speech that is disruptive either because of its content or its me-
thod of distribution and differentiating between the restrictions that can be placed on 
each). 
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the Court expressed a concern with excessively interfering in the ad-
ministration of schools.29  This concern may have led to the develop-
ment of exceptions to the Tinker rule beginning in Bethel School District 
No. 403 v. Fraser.30 
In Fraser, the Court confronted the issue of whether a student 
could be disciplined for making a nominating speech for class 
elected office that described the nominee in sexually suggestive 
terms.31  Matthew Fraser was smart enough32 to know that the way to 
get high school students to sit up and pay attention in an assembly 
where they otherwise would be napping was to “refer[] to his candi-
date in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual meta-
phor.”33  Of course, school officials thought they knew the audience 
as well.  Their worry was that the girls and the younger students could 
be insulted or confused by the speech’s content.34  Thus, they “sus-
pended [him] for three days, and . . . removed [his name] from the 
list of candidates for graduation speaker at the school’s commence-
ment exercises.”35 
 
 29 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (“On the other hand, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the 
need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, con-
sistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in 
the schools.”).  The Court was likely motivated by such concerns in other areas where it 
reviewed school actions, like corporal punishment in schools, which it addressed in Ingra-
ham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).  See The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, supra note 20, at 122 
(“[T]he Court was no doubt motivated by an implicit concern that the judiciary avoid ex-
cessive intervention into local educational policies . . . .”). 
 30 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 31 Id. at 677–78. 
 32 Smart enough to have been named top speaker in the state debate championships two 
years in a row, which likely explains his flair for the dramatic.  Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. 
No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 33 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677–78.  What was so graphic?  Fraser’s speech follows: 
I know a man who is firm—he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his charac-
ter is firm—but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. 
  Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in.  If necessary, he'll 
take an issue and nail it to the wall.  He doesn't attack things in spurts—he drives 
hard, pushing and pushing until finally—he succeeds. 
 Jeff is a man who will go to the very end—even the climax, for each and every 
one of you. 
 So vote for Jeff for A. S. B. vice-president—he'll never come between you and 
the best our high school can be. 
   Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 34 Id. at 683 (“By glorifying male sexuality, and in its verbal content, the speech was acutely 
insulting to teenage girl students . . . . [and] could well be seriously damaging to its less 
mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old and on the threshold of aware-
ness of human sexuality.” (citation omitted)). 
 35 Id. at 678. 
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Who was right?  Probably Matthew Fraser.  It is doubtful many 
students were offended.  They later chose him to speak at graduation, 
even though the school had taken him off the ballot.36  This lends 
credence to Justice Stevens’s conclusion that Fraser “was probably in 
a better position to determine whether an audience composed of 600 
of his contemporaries would be offended by the use of a four-letter 
word—or a sexual metaphor—than is a group of judges who are at 
least two generations and 3,000 miles away from the scene of the 
crime.”37  However, it is likely something entirely different was going 
on, and both sides knew it.  The Court was not protecting individual 
students from insult or offense; it was protecting a particular notion 
of what the school environment should be and to what messages the 
students should be exposed.38 
The conclusion that Tinker and Fraser use two different standards 
is now undeniable following Morse v. Frederick,39 but two questions re-
main:  First, how do these standards interact?  Second, does Morse 
represent an extension of Fraser, or a new test entirely? 
Fraser suggests at one point that its holding is derived from the fact 
that “[u]nlike the sanctions imposed on the students wearing arm-
bands in Tinker, the penalties imposed in this case were unrelated to 
any political viewpoint.”40  This could be read as confining Tinker to 
expressions of political speech, while Fraser deals with “vulgar speech 
and lewd conduct”41 and Morse deals with pro-drug speech.  However, 
this does not make a lot of sense, as the Court has not provided an 
exhaustive list of the types of speech that are “wholly inconsistent 
 
 36 Id. at 692 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 689 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“There is 
no evidence in the record that any students, male or female, found the speech ‘insult-
ing.’”). 
 37 Id. at 692 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 38 See id. at 692 n.2 (“When a more orthodox message is being conveyed to a similar audi-
ence, four Members of today’s majority would treat high school students like college stu-
dents rather than like children.”  (citing Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 
534 (1986) (dissenting opinions))).  A number of commentators have criticized Bethel as 
undermining the rule of Tinker.  See Karrie M. Kalail, Recent Case, Matthew Fraser Sheds His 
Constitutional Rights to Freedom of Speech at the Schoolhouse Gates, 20 AKRON L. REV. 563, 573 
(1987) (“It does not seem necessary at this time to change something that has worked 
well for the past twenty years.  The courts and the schools have worked closely together to 
preserve order and a proper educational environment.”); Sara Slaff, Note, Silencing Stu-
dent Speech:  Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 203, 223 (1987) 
(“Without clear evidence of disruption, students’ free expression rights in school must 
not be abridged.”). 
 39 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2627 (2007) (“Whatever approach Fraser employed, it certainly did not 
conduct the ‘substantial disruption’ analysis prescribed by Tinker . . . .”). 
 40 478 U.S. at 685. 
 41 Id. 
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with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school education.”42  Thus, 
under this reading, a school could not restrict even speech causing a 
substantial disruption unless it was political, lewd, or promoted drug 
use.  Such an interpretation is simply untenable. 
Another reading of Fraser might conclude that it does not forbid 
any specific topic, but simply makes clear that certain methods of 
conveying those messages are not constitutionally protected.43  This 
content versus method distinction is difficult to apply when one con-
siders that the “method” the school and the Court found objection-
able was part of the content of Fraser’s speech. 
All these approaches continue a mistake that has long been made 
with regards to school speech:  that it is somehow different from reg-
ular First Amendment jurisprudence.  Tinker and Fraser could also be 
described as a specific factual microcosm of the free speech rules for 
adults, including their exceptions for obscenity, fighting words, etc.  
Just as the Constitution generally prohibits restrictions on speech, it 
recognizes certain exceptions to that rule:  libel, fighting words, de-
famation, false or misleading commercial speech, and child pornog-
raphy.44 
Fraser represents the enunciation of this rule for the school con-
text.45  As Justice Brennan makes clear, Fraser’s speech would have 
been protected had it been given by an adult outside of school.46  The 
response to this criticism is that there is a vast difference between the 
two situations, and thus a corresponding difference between the rules 
applied to them.  Students may have the right to say things of social 
value, but they do not have the right to use any method or form to 
 
 42 Id. at 685–86. 
 43 See id. at 683 (“Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain 
modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions.”). 
 44 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (child pornography); Cent. Hudson Gas 
& Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–66 (1980) (commercial speech); 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23, 24 (1973) (obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (fighting words); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 269 (1964) (libel); see also Slaff, supra note 38, at 208 n.33 (listing these categories 
and the related cases). 
 45 Unsurprisingly, lower courts have already held that the narrower exemptions, like fight-
ing words, that apply to all free speech continue to be applicable in the school context.  
Even when the words are uttered off-campus, school administrators can punish students’ 
use of language falling within these exemptions.  See, e.g., Fenton v. Stear, 423 F. Supp. 
767 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (holding that a student’s suspension after an incident in a shopping 
center was permissible under the fighting words doctrine). 
 46 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“If respondent had given the same 
speech outside of the school environment, he could not have been penalized simply be-
cause government officials considered his language to be inappropriate . . . .”). 
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disseminate that message.47  The Court has recognized that obscene 
speech is unprotected, and Fraser can be viewed as an extension of 
that doctrine, owing to the unique nature of the school.48 
If Fraser is simply an extension of existing free speech jurispru-
dence, where does that leave Morse?  It would seem to be an opinion 
that stands alone, declaring that pro-drug speech is so harmful that 
“the governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse—reflected 
in the policies of Congress and myriad school boards, including 
JDHS—allow schools to restrict student expression that they reasona-
bly regard as promoting illegal drug use.”49  This is important, be-
cause when the Court permits the government to circumscribe 
speech for all, it generally does so on the basis that “such utterances 
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight 
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.”50  Fraser is an extension of this concept for obscenity, de-
claring that speech that was borderline before, now measured against 
the potential susceptibility of children to its influence, is no longer 
shielded by the Constitution. 
With that in mind, Morse can seem in some places to be a natural 
outgrowth of existing jurisprudence and in some places something 
entirely new.  It is familiar because it is banning not speech that is 
harmful in itself, but speech that could result in harm—the use of 
drugs by students.51  In that sense, it is like Tinker, articulating a stan-
dard that allows the suspension of speech that could reasonably lead 
to a harmful result. 
 
 47 See id. at 682 (majority opinion) (“[T]he First Amendment gives a high school student the 
classroom right to wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s jacket.” (quoting Thomas v. 
Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979))).  Cohen’s jacket refers to a jacket bear-
ing the words “Fuck the Draft” worn by Paul Cohen in the Los Angeles County Court-
house, for which he was arrested for disturbing the peace.  Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 
15 (1971).  The Supreme Court reversed the conviction because, among other reasons, 
“the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammatically pal-
atable to the most squeamish among us.”  Id. at 25. 
 48 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 635 (1968) (“Obscenity is not within the area of 
protected speech or press.”).  But cf. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(“Moreover, despite the Court’s characterizations, the language respondent used is far 
removed from the very narrow class of ‘obscene’ speech which the Court has held is not 
protected by the First Amendment.”). 
 49 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007). 
 50 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 51 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628 (“Drug abuse can cause severe and permanent damage to the 
health and well-being of young people . . . .”). 
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Justice Stevens insists otherwise and relies on the fighting words 
doctrine to come to the conclusion that Morse’s sign cannot be pro-
hibited.52  In relying on the fighting words doctrine as it applies to 
adults, though, he seems to be ignoring part of the Court’s point:  
that the vulnerability of a particular group to a particular type of 
harm can be taken into account in determining whether that harm is 
sufficient.  The difference is in what harmful results are adequate to 
support suppression for each particular audience.53 
There is one aspect of Morse that makes it difficult to integrate 
with the rest of First Amendment jurisprudence.  Most restrictions on 
speech are content-based, but Morse restricts speech on the basis of 
viewpoint, banning only pro-drug speech, not anti-drug speech.  Jus-
tice Stevens also criticizes this aspect of the Court’s opinion.54  
Though the majority attacks him for immediately undermining his 
own argument by admitting that “it might well be appropriate to tol-
erate some targeted viewpoint discrimination in this unique setting,”55 
it also seeks to refocus the argument onto the effects of the speech.56  
While a full discussion of the differences between content and view-
point discrimination is beyond the scope of this Comment, it is worth 
noting that this approach would stand in stark contrast to a case like 
R.A.V. v. St. Paul.57  In that case, the Court was bound to accept a low-
er court determination that the scope of a state hate speech statute 
restricted only speech recognized as fighting words, but it still struck 
 
 52 See id. at 2646 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“No one seriously maintains that drug advocacy 
(much less Frederick’s ridiculous sign) comes within the vanishingly small category of 
speech that can be prohibited because of its feared consequences.  Such advocacy, to bor-
row from Justice Holmes, ‘ha[s] no chance of starting a present conflagration.’” (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting))). 
 53 Another aspect that should eventually be examined is the likelihood of the harmful result 
being obtained from the speech in question.  It does not appear from decisions in the 
lower courts that this has been thoroughly examined, with most inquiries focusing on the 
potential magnitude of the resultant harm.  For example, if a student is “disrespectful” to 
a teacher, there is little question that it will encourage some of his classmates to be disre-
spectful, but how many classmates is it likely to encourage, and will that constitute a ma-
terial disruption?  See generally Shlomit Wallerstein, Criminalising Remote Harm and the Case 
of Anti-Democratic Activity, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2697 (2007) (providing an informative 
breakdown of the issues surrounding criminalization of actions that incite others to vio-
lence or create a climate that might encourage others to violence). 
 54 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2644–46 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 55 Id. at 2646; see id. at 2629 (majority opinion) (criticizing Justice Stevens’s viewpoint). 
 56 See id. at 2628 (majority opinion) (discussing the serious problem of drug abuse by chil-
dren). 
 57 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
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down the law because it facially discriminated on the basis of view-
point.58 
Before I examine the landscape created by Tinker, Fraser, and 
Morse, I will consider the Dartagnan to these Three Musketeers59:  Ha-
zelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.60  While the other three cases speak 
of a general standard of behavior, Hazelwood seems to stand only for 
the proposition that educators can control speech that “one would 
reasonably believe . . . bore the school’s imprimatur.”61  The Court in 
Hazelwood concluded that “the standard articulated in Tinker for de-
termining when a school may punish student expression need not al-
so be the standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend 
its name and resources to the dissemination of student expression.”62 
Hazelwood has led to plenty of debate and discussion, but I believe 
it simply illustrates the idea that the school speech arena is not iso-
lated from developments in wider First Amendment jurisprudence.  
In the past several decades, there has been substantial evolution of 
the government speech doctrine, which recognizes that government 
has a legitimate right to speak63 and to take sides on issues when do-
ing so.64  Hazelwood recognizes that schools are government actors and 
therefore entitled to control speech that could be reasonably viewed 
as originating with them.65 
So, what points the way forward in the world after Morse?  Will we 
keep seeing isolated issues ascend to the High Court one after the 
 
 58 Id. at 381 (“Assuming, arguendo, that all of the expression reached by the ordinance is 
proscribable under the ‘fighting words’ doctrine, we nonetheless conclude that the ordi-
nance is facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on 
the basis of the subjects the speech addresses.”). 
 59 See ALEXANDRE DUMAS, THE THREE MUSKETEERS (New York, Crowell 1894). 
 60 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 61 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2627.  But see Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core:  A 
New Approach to Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 75 (2008) (“The 
courts that have concluded that Hazelwood is inapplicable . . . have done so on the 
grounds that textbook and curricular decisions reflect pure government speech . . . .  In 
contrast, the courts that have applied Hazelwood seem to have interpreted Hazelwood as 
implicitly announcing a generally applicable ‘reasonableness’ standard for all school dis-
trict decisions about speech-related matters.”). 
 62 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272–73. 
 63 See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005) (“[S]ome government pro-
grams involve, or entirely consist of, advocating a position.”). 
 64 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (upholding a government program funding 
health care services, but forbidding doctors from mentioning abortion to patients whose 
care is subsidized by the program). 
 65 See Edward L. Carter et al., Applying Hazelwood to College Speech:  Forum Doctrine and Gov-
ernment Speech in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 157, 177–81 (2006) (linking 
Hazelwood with government speech doctrine more generally). 
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other, “adding to the patchwork of exceptions to the Tinker stan-
dard”66?  In Morse, pro-drug speech is entirely permissible for adults, 
but the potential harm to children is considered so profound that it 
must be banned.  Though drug use by children is unquestionably 
harmful, so are a myriad of other issues:  teen pregnancy, school vio-
lence, low graduation rates, and poor instruction.  It is unclear what 
separates pro-drug speech from the rest. 
Justice Thomas suggests the Court’s “jurisprudence now says that 
students have a right to speak in schools except when they don’t—a 
standard continuously developed through litigation against local 
schools and their administrators.”67  He is probably not far from the 
truth, but that truth is not unusual in constitutional litigation.  The 
rules in school speech are evolving as different cases test, in light of 
different facts, the free speech interests of students against the duty 
of governments to protect and educate them.  This is the manner of 
First Amendment jurisprudence generally.68  Morse may be the begin-
ning of recognition that school speech jurisprudence is not a walled 
garden with its own special standards and rules, completely isolated 
from outside legal developments. 
We may soon see the integration of the school speech line of cases 
with the standard tiers of scrutiny.69  Morse suggests just this result 
when the Court notes that “deterring drug use by schoolchildren is 
an ‘important—indeed, perhaps compelling’ interest.”70  For anyone 
versed in constitutional litigation, these words are heavy with mean-
 
 66 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 67 Id. at 2634. 
 68 This does not, however, mitigate Justice Thomas’s point that this is “a standard continu-
ously developed through litigation against local schools and their administrators,” id., and 
his implicit criticism of such a system that distracts teachers from their primary duty to 
educate. 
 69 This follows a trend of merging a number of independent First Amendment analyses un-
der the umbrella of intermediate scrutiny.  See Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Every-
thing:  Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 784–
85 (“First Amendment intermediate scrutiny thus first emerged as a product of the mer-
ger of several distinct and relatively narrow branches of the Court’s jurisprudence.”); see 
also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 52 (1987) (lump-
ing a number of different tests under the rubric of “[i]ntermediate review”).  This as-
sumes, of course, that the tiered approach itself does not come tumbling down.  See Cal-
vin Massey, The New Formalism:  Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945 
(2004). 
 70 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 
(1995)). 
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ing.  They indicate a balancing of governmental rights against indi-
vidual rights, and suggest a type of intermediate scrutiny.71 
However, it is far from certain that the Court will fold school 
speech jurisprudence into intermediate scrutiny.  Justices Alito and 
Kennedy, for example, may conclude that such an approach would 
be a further extension to which they could not adhere.72  Even if in-
termediate scrutiny is adopted, it says nothing of what the Court will 
hold to be an important interest, especially if it determines the stan-
dard to be an important interest “in light of the special characteristics 
of the school environment.”73 
School speech rules after Morse are not entirely clear, but some 
conclusions can be drawn.  Speech likely to cause a material disrup-
tion can be restricted under Tinker.  Lewd speech can be restricted 
under Fraser.  Pro-drug speech can be restricted under Morse.  The 
only issue is that, while Fraser could have been viewed as an extension 
of broader First Amendment doctrine on obscene speech, the same 
cannot be said of Morse.  So it remains to be seen if the Court will 
continue to approve ad hoc exceptions, attempt to create an over-
arching standard as I have suggested, or overhaul the system entirely, 
as Justice Thomas has recommended.74 
 
 71 Strict scrutiny is the traditional approach for content-based restrictions challenged under 
the Free Speech Clause.  See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Vic-
tims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991) (testing New York’s Son of Sam Law for a compelling 
interest and narrow tailoring).  However, intermediate scrutiny is used in a wide variety of 
content-neutral regulations on speech.  See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 
781, 791 (1989) (time, place, and manner restrictions); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. 
v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (“The State must assert a substantial in-
terest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech.”); United States v. O’Brien, 
391 U.S. 367 (1968) (applying intermediate scrutiny to symbolic conduct). 
 72 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating in his opinion, which Justice 
Kennedy joined:  “I join the opinion of the Court with the understanding that the opin-
ion does not endorse any further extension”).  Of course, the concurrence also states that 
both Justices “join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that the opinion does 
not hold that the special characteristics of the public schools necessarily justify any other 
speech restrictions.”  Id. at 2637 (emphasis added).  This does not preclude further per-
missible restriction, so long as the case in question presents a more compelling regulatory 
interest than pro-drug speech, residing as it does at the “far reaches of what the First 
Amendment permits.”  Id. at 2638. 
 73 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 74 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I think the better approach is to dis-
pense with Tinker altogether, and given the opportunity, I would do so.”). 
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II.  EXAMINING OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH 
As difficult as the behavioral boundaries of school speech can 
sometimes be to navigate, its physical boundaries are even more un-
certain.  There is a simple reason for that:  despite discussing student 
First Amendment rights in at least five significant cases (Tinker, Fraser, 
Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico,75 
Hazelwood, and Morse), the Supreme Court has thus far only obliquely 
examined the extent to which the student speech doctrine extends 
beyond the physical boundaries of the school.  Cut adrift without Su-
preme Court guidance, the lower courts and numerous commenta-
tors have attempted to divine the extent to which the school speech 
doctrine reaches off-campus conduct, but it is not clear if they have 
had any success.  While I suspect the Court will eventually have to 
confront this issue head-on and I may therefore be adding my voice 
to a storm soon to be quelled, I will nevertheless make the attempt 
because it is an important component of an examination of school 
speech in the Internet age. 
The Supreme Court’s only examination (if one can call it that) of 
the off-campus speech issue came recently in Morse, where it recog-
nized “some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts 
should apply school-speech precedents, but not on these facts.”76  Its 
determination was based on the fact that Morse’s actions were di-
rected towards the school and visible by its students.  They took place 
across the street, during regular school hours, at an event sanctioned 
by the school and supervised by its staff.77  The Court concluded that 
“Frederick cannot stand in the midst of his fellow students, during 
 
 75 457 U.S. 853 (1982).  This case is not always cited as a major school speech case because it 
did not actually deal with the right of students to speak, but dealt instead with their right 
to receive information.  In Pico, the Court was faced with the question of whether a school 
board could have books removed from the school library because it disagreed with their 
content.  Id. at 856–57, 873.  The Court held that it could not.  Id. at 875.  However, Jus-
tice Brennan’s opinion spoke for only a plurality of the Court and may no longer be good 
law in the wake of United States v. American Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003), in which the 
Court approved Congress’s requirement of filtering software as a condition of funding 
provided to libraries.  See Richard J. Peltz, Pieces of Pico:  Saving Intellectual Freedom in the 
Public School Library, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 103, 147 (“ALA thus left Pico on uncertain 
terms.  Is the omission of a reference to Pico an acknowledgement of the apparent dis-
tinction between selection and removal?  Or does the Rehnquist plurality mean to imply 
that Pico has no vitality as precedent?”). 
 76 127 S. Ct. at 2624 (citing Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 n.22 (5th 
Cir. 2004)). 
 77 Id. 
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school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and claim he is not at 
school.”78 
In acknowledging the uncertainty in the lower courts, the Chief 
Justice cited Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board, which addressed 
the issue of holding Adam Porter responsible for a drawing he had 
made at the age of fourteen depicting his school under siege and his 
principal being attacked.79  The sketch was on a pad that was stored 
away in the closet and only emerged two years later when his younger 
brother decided to draw a llama and take it to school.80  Another stu-
dent spotted the earlier drawing and showed it to the bus driver, who 
confiscated the pad and informed the school, which led to the sus-
pension of both Adam and his younger brother.81 
In Porter, the Fifth Circuit held that Adam’s drawing was “not ex-
actly speech on campus or even speech directed at the campus.”82  
The court recognized that its precedent had previously held students 
responsible for off-campus speech, as had the Seventh Circuit and a 
number of district courts.83  Nevertheless, the court concluded that 
“the fact that Adam’s drawing was composed off-campus and re-
mained off-campus for two years until it was unintentionally taken to 
school by his younger brother takes the present case outside the 
scope of these precedents.”84 
So we have rough boundaries:  Morse at one end and Porter at the 
other.  Only a few circuits have examined the space between.  Before 
I consider their opinions, it will be helpful to frame the issues.  The 
first is which, if any, of the standards applies off-campus.  Is it Tinker 
alone, or Fraser, as well?85  The second issue is what culpability the 
speaker had in the speech reaching the school.  There are three basic 
possibilities:  the speaker could actually have directed the speech at 
the school, he could have realized it was likely the speech would 
reach the school, or he could simply have realized it was possible that 
the speech would reach the school. 
 
 78 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 79 393 F.3d at 611. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 611–12. 
 82 Id. at 615. 
 83 Id. at 615 n.22. 
 84 Id. at 616 n.22. 
 85 At the time of this Comment’s publication, no court of appeals has yet examined whether 
Morse applies to conduct that is more clearly off-campus than the situation presented in 
the case itself. 
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In Boucher v. School Board of the School District of Greenfield, the Sev-
enth Circuit reversed a preliminary injunction blocking the expulsion 
of a student who had written an underground student newspaper on 
how to hack the school’s computers.86  Though the articles were writ-
ten off-campus, the paper was distributed on campus.87  The Seventh 
Circuit noted that “the district court found that the article advocates 
on-campus activity.”88  Thus, it had no problem concluding that the 
paper was subject to Tinker and its progeny.89  Though this is cited by 
other courts as an off-campus speech case, because the paper was ac-
tually distributed on school grounds, it should probably not be 
viewed as one. 
In Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District, the Fifth Circuit 
permitted the suspension of a student for the distribution of a paper 
just outside the school grounds as students entered.90  The school had 
a policy requiring prior submission of papers to be distributed, and 
following a warning by the principal, Paul Kitchen was suspended.91  
In the ensuing disciplinary proceedings, Paul insulted the school and 
the principal, using (amongst other things) “‘the common Anglo-
Saxon vulgarism for sexual intercourse.’”92 
The Fifth Circuit did not address the fact that the speech was off-
campus, and it even conceded that “his actions did not materially and 
substantially disrupt school activities.”93  Nevertheless, the court up-
held the suspension because of Paul’s “flagrant disregard of estab-
lished school regulations.”94  Given when and where Paul distributed 
the papers, it can at least be said that it was likely the papers would 
make their way onto campus, and it would be reasonable to say that 
Paul directed them at campus.  Thus, the Fifth Circuit has apparently 
 
 86 134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 87 See id. at 828–29. 
 88 Id. at 829. 
 89 Id. 
 90 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 91 Id. at 1074. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 1076.  Given the insubordination that Paul Kitchen had shown to school officials, it 
is a little surprising that the Fifth Circuit did not simply conclude that insubordination it-
self constituted a disruption or at least relied on the “expectation of disruption” standard.  
Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 212 (3d Cir. 2001).  Of course, given how 
soon this was decided after Tinker, it is possible that this standard had simply not yet de-
veloped. 
 94 Sullivan, 475 F.2d at 1077 (“Today we merely recognize the right of school authorities to 
punish students for the flagrant disregard of established school regulations; we ask only 
that the student seeking equitable relief from allegedly unconstitutional actions by school 
officials come into court with clean hands.”). 
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held that off-campus speech directed at campus can be punished 
even when it does not cause a material disruption.95 
The Second Circuit addressed the issue of off-campus speech in 
Thomas v. Board of Education.96  There, in a case involving the primarily 
off-campus publication of an irreverent satirical magazine, the court 
noted that though it could “envision a case in which a group of stu-
dents incites substantial disruption within the school from some re-
mote locale,” it did not have to address the issue because “there was 
simply no threat or forecast of material and substantial disruption 
within the school.”97  However, the Second Circuit also set an appar-
ently strong presumption against punishing off-campus speech, ex-
plaining that: 
When school officials are authorized only to punish speech on school 
property, the student is free to speak his mind when the school day ends.  
In this manner, the community is not deprived of the salutary effects of 
expression, and educational authorities are free to establish an academic 
environment in which the teaching and learning process can proceed 
free of disruption.  Indeed, our willingness to grant school officials sub-
stantial autonomy within their academic domain rests in part on the con-
finement of that power within the metes and bounds of the school it-
self.98 
In Killion v. Franklin Regional School District, the District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania reviewed the punishment of a 
student for a derogatory top ten list that insulted the school’s athletic 
director.99  Canvassing a number of cases and jurisdictions, it con-
cluded that “[t]he overwhelming weight of authority has analyzed 
student speech (whether on or off campus) in accordance with Tink-
er.  Further, because the Bozzuto list was brought on campus, albeit 
by an unknown person, Tinker applies.”100 
That reasoning seemingly conflicts with the guiding principles 
laid down by the Second Circuit in Thomas.  If students are subject to 
punishment because of their off-campus speech simply because an 
unknown individual brings it onto campus without their knowledge 
or consent, then they are not really free to speak their mind.  In Kil-
lion, the student, Zachariah Paul, had already been warned (after a 
 
 95 The continuing vitality of this holding is questionable.  As previously noted, under more 
modern doctrine, the Fifth Circuit would have been able to use the “expectation of dis-
ruption” standard as well as a fuller understanding of Tinker itself. 
 96 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 97 Id. at 1052 n.17. 
 98 Id. at 1052. 
 99 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001). 
100 Id. at 455. 
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previous list) that he would be punished if he brought another list to 
school.101  He therefore created the list at home, e-mailed it to 
friends, and did not attempt to bring it to school.102  Had he known 
that he would be punished for these actions, perhaps he would not 
have spoken at all.103 
The Killion court does come to the conclusion though that Fraser 
would be an inapplicable precedent to use in the case of off-campus 
speech.  It cites Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Fraser104 as well as 
the principles set forth in Thomas and other cases in coming to the 
conclusion that while Tinker may reasonably be applied to the out-of-
school context, Fraser may not.105 
To summarize, the status of off-campus speech in the wake of 
Morse is as unclear as the question of what speech can be restricted.  
Nevertheless, courts have generally agreed that speech originating 
off-campus that is purposely directed on-campus and causes or could 
reasonably be foreseen to cause a material disruption can be re-
stricted. 
III.  THE PARTICULAR DANGERS OF THE INTERNET 
By now, parents, teachers, and anyone else responsible for the 
care and safety of children should be aware of the potential dangers 
of the Internet.  The ease of communication and relative anonymity 
that it affords can have a corrosive effect on the judgment and man-
ners of even responsible adults.106  Moreover, the dangerous content 
 
101 Id. at 448. 
102 Id. 
103 The court in Killion ultimately held that “Paul’s suspension violates the First Amendment 
because defendants failed to satisfy Tinker’s substantial disruption test.”  Id. at 455.  How-
ever, this does not remove the implication that, under the Court’s reasoning, Tinker could 
potentially apply anywhere in the world at any time if the individual is a student and their 
speech somehow finds its way onto campus.  This seems in tension with the principles of 
Thomas and in clear contradiction of the holding in Porter. 
104 Id. at 456 (“‘[I]f respondent had given the same speech outside the school environment, 
he could not have been penalized simply because government officials considered his 
language to be inappropriate. . . .’” (second alteration in original) (citing Bethel Sch. 
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring))). 
105 Id. at 458 (“Given the out of school creation of the list, absent evidence that Paul was re-
sponsible for bringing the list on school grounds, and absent disruption . . . we 
hold . . . that defendants could not, without violating the First Amendment, suspend Paul 
for the mere creation of the Bozzuto Top Ten list.”). 
106 See, e.g., The Editors of Fortune, The 101 Dumbest Moments in Business, 2007, FORTUNE, 
Dec. 24, 2007, at 147 (“‘I like Mackey’s haircut.  I think he looks cute.’—Whole Foods CEO 
John Mackey, posting under the screen name Rahodeb, on a Yahoo Finance stock forum.  The Fed-
eral Trade Commission reveals that Mackey authored this and numerous other posts over 
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of the Internet can have an especially negative influence on impres-
sionable young minds.  It exposes students to predators,107 “stalking, 
bullying, raunchy photos and videos, too much time spent on social 
networking sites, academic fraud,”108 and even increased temptation 
to commit suicide.109 
At the same time, the Internet can be a powerful educational tool 
and a celebration of the best of human nature.  Near-instantaneous 
communication shrinks the world in which we live.  Online news web-
sites enable us to read articles from the New York Times, the Sydney He-
rald, and the Jerusalem Post all at the same time.110  Online entertain-
ment lets us watch the television show, American Gladiators,111 at our 
own convenience.112  From the encouraging to the disheartening, the 
enriching to the corrupting, the Internet puts it at our fingertips.  
Most importantly for schools, though, it is now an essential part of life 
and business for many adults, and therefore an essential part of edu-
cation for students the world over.113 
Focusing specifically on the ability to restrict student speech nar-
rows the issues.  Teachers and the courts are generally worried about 
the ability of students at home to project disruption onto school 
 
an eight-year period, hyping his company and himself while trashing the competitor he 
hoped to acquire, Wild Oats.”).  See generally Penny Arcade!—Green Blackboards (And 
Other Anomalies), http://www.penny-arcade.com/comic/2004/03/19 (last visited Jan. 
15, 2009) (expounding a theory of the effect on a normal person of the anonymity and 
audience the Internet provides). 
107 See, e.g., Dena Potter, Victim Battles Child Sex ‘Monsters,’ DAILY PRESS (Newport News, Va.), 
Jan. 24, 2008 (discussing the efforts of Alicia Kozakiewicz, a Pennsylvania teenager ab-
ducted in 2002 after meeting a man online, to expand police efforts to fight online pre-
dators). 
108 Alan Sepinwall, What Your Kids Are up to Online, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Jan. 22, 
2008, at 29. 
109 See David Pilditch, Dangers That Lurk on Friends’ Websites, EXPRESS (U.K.), Jan. 24, 2008, at 
17 (“Anne Parry, of the suicide prevention charity Papyrus, said:  ‘We’ve been running a 
campaign for the last three years to try to draw attention to the dangers of the inter-
net.’ . . . In a study earlier this month, the charity found a growing number of young peo-
ple were committing suicide after reading about it on the internet.”). 
110 See New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com (last visited Jan. 15, 2009); Jerusalem Post, 
http://www.jpost.com (last visited Jan. 15, 2009); Sydney Morning Herald, available at 
http://www.smh.com.au (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). 
111  American Gladiators (NBC television broadcasts 2008). 
112 American Gladiators:  Video, http://www.nbc.com/American_Gladiators/video/index.
shtml#mea=282944 (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). 
113 See, e.g., Matt Walcoff, Kenyan Teacher Outlines Internet Needs, RECORD (Kitchener-Waterloo, 
Ontario), Nov. 19, 2007, at B3 (“Computer literacy is an essential part of education that 
can help young Africans escape the cycle of poverty and benefit from the global econ-
omy, said Kaye Jackson of Cobourg, co-founder of the Canada/Kenya-Rarieda Develop-
ment Programme, or CANRAD.”). 
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grounds, causing harm from a distance unimagined in Tinker.  Social 
networking sites are a particular danger.  Two social networking sites 
currently dominate the landscape:  Facebook, with approximately 
30.6 million unique users every month, and MySpace, with approxi-
mately 68.1 million.114 
Both have had their problems.  MySpace has come under fire for 
its use by child predators.115  In response, “it detected and deleted 
29,000 convicted sex offenders on its service” in July 2007.116  Face-
book has been criticized for things like its Beacon service, which 
“tracked purchases Facebook members made on other Web sites and 
sent alerts to their Facebook friends about the transactions.”117 
The problem with sites like MySpace and Facebook is that they 
tend to magnify issues already present on the Internet.  Users can 
post things that are “part diary, part photo album, with gossip, favor-
ite music, pet peeves—sometimes even phone numbers and home 
addresses.  And occasionally, revealing pictures.”118  All of these are 
available at other sites.  The difference with social networking sites is 
threefold:  (1) these functions are gathered together in one place; 
(2) the sites have massive user bases and daily traffic; and (3) your 
friends have quick and convenient access to everything you post. 
Facebook’s personal privacy settings allow you to adjust precisely 
who can see what you post,119 but by default, information can be seen 
by any of your friends and anyone in your networks.120  Since networks 
include both major cities and major universities, when you post a pic-
ture you later regret, it is probably not comforting that it was “only” 
available to the Philadelphia major metropolitan area or every Penn 
State student and alum.  Also, though Facebook does some filtering 
 
114 Ante, supra note 11. 
115 See Pete Williams, MySpace, Facebook Attract Online Predators, MSNBC.COM, Feb. 3, 2006, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11165576/ (discussing the use of MySpace by teenagers 
and the assaults of children occurring after meeting individuals on the site). 
116 MySpace Deletes 29,000 Sex Offenders, REUTERS, July 24, 2007, available at http://
www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSN2424879820070724?feedType=RSS&rpc=
22&sp=true. 
117 Facebook Adds Privacy Features, USA TODAY, Mar. 18, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.
com/tech/products/2008-03-18-179825145_x.htm. 
118 Williams, supra note 115. 
119 Help Center:  Privacy, How can I protect my privacy?, http://www.facebook.com/help.
php?page=419 (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (“You can customize your privacy settings from 
the Privacy page.  From here you have total control over who can view all of your con-
tent.”). 
120 Help Center:  Privacy, How Can I Control Who Can See My Profile?, http://www.
facebook.com/help.php?page=419 (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (“By default, only users 
within your networks and your confirmed friends can view your profile.”). 
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when you claim an affiliation with a college121 or high school net-
work,122 it will not perform any filtering when you join a regional net-
work.123  So that guy who says he is from “West Philadelphia born and 
raised”124 may actually be from the South Side of Chicago or Corpus 
Christi, Texas.  There is simply no way to know. 
As problematic as this is, the real issue in the school speech con-
text is school network affiliation.  As I noted, under Facebook’s de-
fault privacy settings, anyone attending a school would have access to 
student posts.  Even under restricted settings, their friends (which 
likely include many of their classmates) would have access.125  Very 
quickly, a message written in the heat of the moment, an embarrass-
ing picture, or an unflattering description of a faculty member can 
become the talk of the school. 
The rapid distribution of painful insults can magnify an existing 
problem.  Billy Wolfe knows this well.  He is a sophomore at a high 
school in Fayetteville, Arkansas, and bullies have been picking on him 
since he was twelve.126  Facebook only made things worse.  In ninth 
grade, some boys started a Facebook group named “Every One That 
Hates Billy Wolfe.”127 
 
121 Help Center:  Networks, What Do I Need in Order to Join a Supported Facebook Net-
work?, http://www.facebook.com/help.php?page=403 (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (“To 
join a college network, you need to have a valid school email account.”). 
122 Id. (“If you have a school email address or an invitation from another member of your 
high school network, you will be able to affiliate during registration.  Alterna-
tively, . . . you will need to be approved by a member of your high school network in or-
der to join it.”). 
123 Id. (“Just enter your city, and we’ll show you the regional networks closest to you.”).  Fa-
cebook does, however, restrict how frequently you can change your regional network.  See 
I Can’t Add a Network., http://www.facebook.com/help.php?page=403  (last visited Jan. 
15, 2009) (“Facebook limits all users to a single regional network.  This region can only 
be changed twice every sixty days from the ‘Networks’ tab of the Account page.  These 
limits are in place to protect the privacy of our users’ accounts.”). 
124  See DJ JAZZY JEFF & THE FRESH PRINCE, The Fresh Prince of Bel Air, on  DJ JAZZY JEFF & THE 
FRESH PRINCE:  THE GREATEST HITS (Zomba Productions Ltd. 1988); see also Fresh Prince 
of Bel Air Theme Song Lyrics, http://www.jazzyjefffreshprince.com/lyrics/will-smith/b-
sides/will-smith-fresh-prince-of-bel-air-theme.htm (last visited on Jan. 15, 2009). 
125 People should carefully consider who they leave on their friends list.  Photos posted by 
two Penn State students that showed them dressed up in Halloween costumes mocking 
the Virginia Tech shootings were restricted so that only friends could view them, but they 
were still discovered and distributed by “a Virginia Tech senior and ‘high school enemy’” 
of one of the pair.  Lauren Boyer, Students Defend Costume Choice, DAILY COLLEGIAN, Dec. 
10, 2007, available at http://www.collegian.psu.edu/archive/2007/12/10/students_
defend_costume_choice.aspx. 
126 Dan Barry, A Boy the Bullies Love to Beat Up, Repeatedly, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2008, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/24/us/24land.html?ex=1364097600&en=
a959e88983771fc2&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss. 
127 Id. 
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Facebook “feeds” only amplify these problems.  Whenever you 
change your profile, update your status, post a picture, or write a 
message on a friend’s wall, your actions get listed on your friends’ 
homepages.128  They do not have access to information they could not 
already have gotten by checking your profile, your pictures, etc.,129 but 
it does “make[] it easier for people to get that information pushed to 
them.”130  Suddenly, not only is there a group whose purpose is to 
mock a student by calling him a “bitch” and a “homosexual that NO 
ONE LIKES,”131 but everyone knows about it immediately. 
The initial introduction of the feature caused outrage among Fa-
cebook users, who formed online protest groups joined by thousands 
of people.132  One user described it as “kind of stalker-ish.”133  The 
Washington Post viewed it as an example of Facebook’s “immense 
popularity backfir[ing],”134 exposing more users to more information 
more quickly, and fanning the flames of outrage harder and faster 
than would have occurred otherwise.  Facebook has since “intro-
duced privacy settings that give users more control over what infor-
mation gets broadcast to members of their social network”135 but it 
did not abandon the feature.136 
In order to illustrate the effect of these features, let’s consider an 
example from a case I discussed earlier.  One can take the insulting 
top-ten list from Killion137 and imagine that instead of simply e-mailing 
 
128 See Bambi Francisco, Facebook’s Growing Pains, MARKETWATCH, Sept. 14, 2006, 
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/Story.aspx?guid=f84d887b-6e05-4c47-a30d-
f2895ccdf0cb&siteid=mktw&dist=morenews (“Facebook’s News Feed—for those unclear 
about what it is—works just like alerts or headlines on RSS readers or pages.  The only 
difference is that news on Facebook’s feeds isn’t about the latest problems at H-P, or 
Google’s quarterly results, but rather whether someone is single or not.”). 
129 Id. (“Facebook’s news feeds never broadcast information to people who would not have 
already had access to that personal information.”); see also Help Center:  News Feed, What 
Privacy Settings Are Used for News Feed?, http://www.facebook.com/help.php?page=408 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (“You will only see stories about actions that you have permis-
sion to see, as determined by the privacy settings of the person who made the action.”). 
130 See Francisco, supra note 128. 
131 Barry, supra note 126. 
132 Susan Kinzie & Yuki Noguchi, In Online Social Club, Sharing Is the Point Until It Goes Too Far, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2006, at A1 (“Within hours, online protest groups were formed and 
thousands of people had joined.”). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Laura Schreier, After Uproar, Facebook Boosts Privacy:  Complaints Prompt Networking Site to 
Upgrade Its Upgrade, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 9, 2006, at 10A. 
136 Id. 
137 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
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the list to friends, he posted it on a classmate’s Facebook wall.138  If 
both Zachariah Paul (the plaintiff in Killion) and his friend leave 
their privacy settings on the default, then essentially the entire school 
will instantly have access to the fact that the athletic director “is con-
stantly tripping over his own chins.”139  Moreover, anyone logging in 
to the site will see that Paul posted something and can click a simple 
link to go to it.  In many cases, the text of the post may appear in the 
feed.  It is the twenty-first century equivalent of taking out a giant 
roadside ad right in front of the school. 
In this Section, I have examined the problems that the Internet 
and social networking sites present in the school speech context.  
They combine instantaneous communication with the ability to dis-
tribute information  (sometimes unintentionally) to a large group of 
people.  If they are accessed on campus, then they are no different 
than an underground newspaper like the one in Sullivan v. Houston 
Independent School District.140 
IV.  WHAT SCHOOLS CAN DO 
This Comment has examined the evolution of school speech law 
to this point, both in what can be regulated and when it can be regu-
lated.  It has also looked at the unique issues raised by student speech 
being conducted on the Internet and particularly on social network-
ing sites.  It is time to consider all of these elements.  The final ques-
tion in this examination of school speech in the Internet age is:  
“What can schools do about all this?” 
They could choose to eliminate Internet access in schools entirely, 
but as we have seen, it is now becoming such a vital part of life and 
business that technological literacy may be almost as important as 
math or science.  Schools could also choose to employ filtering soft-
ware.141  Even these responses may be ineffective, though.  The social 
 
138 The wall is a particular area on an individual’s profile page where friends can write mes-
sages, post links, etc.  See Help Center:  Wall, http://www.facebook.com/help.php?page
=443 (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). 
139 Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448 n.1 (W.D. Pa. 2001). 
140 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973); see supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text. 
141 See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003) (upholding a condition 
Congress put on library funding that mandated the use of filtering software by the librar-
ies receiving the funds); see also supra note 75 (discussing a previous case, Pico, 457 U.S. 
853 (1982), and its questionable validity in light of the decision in American Library Ass’n).  
Regardless of the applicable law, these solutions are easily circumvented.  See Peacefire:  
To Get Around Your Blocking Software, http://www.peacefire.org (last visited Jan. 15, 
2009) (listing various ways of disabling or getting around blocking software). 
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links and software features on sites like Facebook still permit students 
to rapidly share potentially disruptive information.  Postings that in-
sult or undermine teachers and administrators, cause fights between 
students, or can otherwise cause a significant disruption in the school 
are still being spread rapidly among students even if none of them 
access it in the building. 
Some judges have already addressed these issues.  In Wisniewski v. 
Board of Education of Weedsport Central School District, the Second Circuit 
addressed off-campus electronic speech head-on, concluding that Aa-
ron Wisniewski could be punished for having an Instant Messenger 
icon depicting a person being shot in the head with the words “Kill 
Mr. VanderMolen” below it.142  The court concluded that “[t]he fact 
that Aaron’s creation and transmission of the IM icon occurred away 
from school property does not necessarily insulate him from school 
discipline.”143  However, the panel was divided on the rationale, so it is 
unclear how useful Wisniewski is for laying a framework.144  Neverthe-
less, finding that the school’s punishment was permissible under the 
Tinker standard, the court upheld Aaron’s suspension.145 
In Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District, the District Court for 
the Eastern District of Missouri reviewed the suspension of Brandon 
Beussink for creating a vulgar webpage “critical of the administration 
at Woodland High School.”146  He had created it at home, on his own 
computer, outside of school hours.147  After a dispute, a student who 
viewed the page at Beussink’s house showed it to the computer 
teacher at their high school.148  Beussink was suspended, and applica-
tion of the high school’s policy on unexcused absences (which in-
cludes days on suspension) resulted in him “failing all of the classes 
 
142 494 F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2007).  Mr. VanderMolen was the plaintiff’s English teacher at 
the time.  Id. 
143 Id. at 39. 
144 Id. (“In this case, the panel is divided as to whether it must be shown that it was reasona-
bly foreseeable that Aaron’s IM icon would reach the school property or whether the un-
disputed fact that it did reach the school pretermits any inquiry as to this aspect of rea-
sonable foreseeability.”). 
145 Id. at 38–39 (“Even if Aaron’s transmission of an icon depicting and calling for the killing 
of his teacher could be viewed as an expression of opinion within the meaning of Tinker, 
we conclude that it crosses the boundary of protected speech and constitutes student 
conduct that poses a reasonably foreseeable risk that . . . it would materially and substan-
tially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
146 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177 (E.D. Mo. 1998). 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 1178. 
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in which he was enrolled for the second semester of his junior 
year.”149 
The court concluded that Beussink’s suspension was improper be-
cause his actions “did not materially and substantially interfere with 
school discipline.”150  However, perhaps the most notable part of the 
opinion is that it sidesteps the off-campus issue entirely.  Granted, the 
page did not rise to the Tinker standard of disruption, but given the 
“crude and vulgar language”151 employed, one would think the court 
would at least mention Fraser.  Of course, this may reflect the reason-
ing of Killion that Fraser’s standard is inapplicable to off-campus 
speech.152 
The court in Doninger v. Niehoff did not find such an argument 
persuasive.153  The case dealt with a student’s punishment for a post 
on her LiveJournal that referred to school administrators as “dou-
chebags.”154  LiveJournal is a site which, like Facebook and MySpace, 
permits users to list their friends and thereby easily access each oth-
er’s entries.155  For this reason, it implicates many of the same con-
cerns discussed with regards to social networking sites.  The court, re-
lying on Wisniewski, “believe[d] that Avery’s blog entry may be 
considered on-campus speech for the purposes of the First Amend-
ment.”156  It relied especially on the foreseeability of the speech being 
viewed by other students and school administrators.157 
In short, the courts seem to be split.  There is general support, 
both under off-campus speech precedents and under these electronic 
speech cases, for regulating off-campus electronic speech under the 
Tinker standard.  Whether schools will also be able to regulate off-
 
149 Id. at 1180. 
150 Id. at 1181. 
151 Id. at 1177. 
152 See Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 457 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (“Al-
though we agree that several passages from the list are lewd, abusive, and derogatory, we 
cannot ignore the fact that the relevant speech, like that in Klein and Thomas, occurred 
within the confines of Paul’s home, far removed from any school premises or facilities.”). 
153 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007). 
154 Id. at 206. 
155 See FAQ Question #61, http://www.livejournal.com/support/faqbrowse.bml?faqid=61&
view=full (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). 
156 Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 217. 
157 Id. (“Most importantly, the content of the blog was related to school issues, and it was rea-
sonably foreseeable that other LMHS students would view the blog and that school ad-
ministrators would become aware of it.”).   
   The Second Circuit affirmed this decision in Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 
2008).  
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campus electronic speech under Fraser is a much more tenuous ques-
tion. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Since Tinker was decided, school speech has been a contentious is-
sue.  Students want the right to express themselves freely.  Adminis-
trators want the right to enforce school rules and to create an atmos-
phere conducive to learning.  The courts are trying to balance these 
competing interests and to maintain the integrity of the First 
Amendment while advancing the state’s compelling interest in edu-
cating its children. 
This was difficult enough before the Internet and social network-
ing sites made statements that were once confined to underground 
newspapers or graffiti on the wall of the bathroom stall available to all 
and widely publicized.  It seems clear that schools can regulate any 
speech, electronic or not, on-campus or not, that is likely to cause a 
material disruption.  Whether they may go beyond that and apply the 
Supreme Court’s more recent standards from Fraser and Morse is yet 
to be decided. 
The courts should be willing to apply both Fraser and Morse, but in 
sharply circumscribed situations, namely where students have specifi-
cally targeted the school with their speech.  Otherwise, the Internet 
would make it possible to skirt Tinker-and-Fraser-era restrictions simply 
because there is now a back door into the school that did not then 
exist.  Direct targeting of the school by students is insubordinate.  It 
should be considered an attempt to undermine teacher authority and 
rightly punished on that basis.  However, such a policy will require 
careful monitoring by the courts to ensure that schools are not pun-
ishing students simply for targeting other students, absent some sub-
stantial disruption that spills over into the school setting.  Schools 
should not be policing student social relationships. 
Beyond intentionally targeted speech, there is great value in the 
Second Circuit’s determination that the student should be “free to 
speak his mind when the school day ends”158 and that “our willingness 
to grant school officials substantial autonomy within their academic 
domain rests in part on the confinement of that power within the 
metes and bounds of the school itself.”159  Education is vital and 
school discipline is essential to providing an effective education.  
 
158 Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 (2d Cir. 1979). 
159 Id. 
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Nevertheless, the free expression of students and their free interac-
tion with their peers is also important, and it should not be curtailed 
simply because of the development of new technology. 
